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Identifier
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Thesis_MES_2020_PearsonP
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Title
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Initiative 1631- The Effect of Worldview on Voting
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Date
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2020
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Creator
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Pearson, Philip
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extracted text
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INITIATIVE 1631- THE EFFECT OF WORLDVIEW ON VOTING
By
Philip L. Pearson
A Thesis
Submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree
Master of Environmental Studies
The Evergreen State College
December 2020
© {2021} by Philip L. Pearson. All rights reserved
This Thesis for the Master of Environmental Studies Degree
by
Philip L. Pearson
has been approved for
The Evergreen State College
By
__________________
Dr. Shawn Olson Hazboun
Member of the Faculty
______________
Date
ABSTRACT
Initiative 1631- The Effect of Worldview on Voting
Philip L. Pearson
Research had found that worldview can be a strong predictor of how people view and
vote on serious social issues. Cultural cognition theory (CCT) suggests that worldview
exists prior to people learning about social issues, and their worldview may help to
determine how they will look at and vote on risk issues. CCT says that people can be
analyzed using two different but related worldview constructs, the grid and the group.
The grid continuum measures how people view classification, with egalitarians at one
end of the scale and hierarchists at the other end. The other continuum is the group with
individualists at one end and communitarians at the other end. Amazon Mechanical Turk
was used to recruit 503 participants who resided in Washington State and who voted in
the 2018 general election on a carbon reduction initiative, I-1631. The participants
answered several questions about demographics, knowledge of climate science, political
party, and two six-question sets that measure the two dimensions of worldview. The
initiative proposed to reduce carbon emissions by placing a fee on large emitters of
carbon dioxide. The study found that males were more likely than females to vote against
I-1631 and Republicans and independents tended to vote against the initiative more than
Democrats. The more voters knew about climate science, the more likely they were to
vote for the initiative. However, the strongest predictor of how participants voted on I1631was their worldview. Voters at the hierarchy end of the grid scale and voters at the
individualism end of the group scale were significantly more likely to vote against I-1631
than were voters at the other end of the scales. These finding are consistent with prior
research.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER
I. INTRODUCTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2
Problem Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5
Research Questions and Related Hypotheses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
8
Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
9
Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
9
Justification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
9
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
10
II. LITERATURE REVIEW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
11
Theoretical Foundation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Anthropogenic Climate Change and Climate Denial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
21
Initiative 1631 (I-1631) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
35
Other Carbon Reduction Efforts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
38
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
38
iv
III. METHODOLOGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
40
Research Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
40
Respondents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
42
Instrumentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Implementation of the Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
43
Analytical Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
43
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
IV. RESULTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Statistical Analyses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
58
Major Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
59
Findings Related to the Research Hypotheses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
60
Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
63
Additional Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
63
Recommendations for Practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
Recommendations for Future Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
64
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
v
REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
66
APPENDICES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
A. Survey Instrument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
72
B. HSR Approval. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
LIST OF FIGURES
Figures
1.
Cultural worldview: two continuums ……………………. 18
2.
Grid and Group dimensions ……………………………… 20
3.
Voting on I-1631 …………………………………………. 49
4.
Voting by gender …………………………………………. 51
5.
Voting by population of residence ………………………...52
6.
Voting by party affiliation …………………………………53
7.
Voting by knowledge of climate science …………………. 53
vi
LIST OF TABLES
Tables
1.
Descriptive statistics and cross tabulations by voting behavior…... 47
2.
Main reasons for voting for I-1631 ….……………………….…... 50
3.
Main reasons for voting against I-1631 …………………………. 51
4.
Binary logistic regression models predicting voting…..………… 56
vii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
I am greatly indebted to Dr. Shawn Olson Hazboun for showing me the value of
environmental sociology as we struggle with overcoming climate change. As are so many
issues, climate change is a human- caused problem and solving it will require humaninspired solutions. Sociology is an important part of this solution. During my classes with
Dr. Hazboun, I developed a deep appreciation for looking at various environmental issues
through the sociology lens. This inspired me to develop a thesis project that used
sociology to observe human actions regarding a contemporary carbon reduction attempt,
a carbon fee initiative during the 2018 Washington State election. With Dr. Hazboun’s
kind and effective guidance, I was able to complete a very interesting project that
provides evidence on how better to support future carbon reduction efforts.
viii
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
This chapter provides a brief introduction to the issue of a voter sponsored
initiative in the Washington State general election in November 2018, called Initiative
1631 (I-1631). The initiative attempted to place a fee on the emissions of carbon dioxide
(CO2) in order to reduce CO2 emissions in Washington. I-1631 lost approximate 55% to
45% (Washington Initiative 1631, Carbon Emissions Fee Measure, 2018). This research
used cultural cognition theory (Dake, 1991; Douglas, 2003; Kahan, 2007; Kahan &
Braman, 2006; Wildavsky & Dake, 1990) to examine what factors were related to voters’
choice to either vote for or against I-1631. Research suggests that worldview may play a
significant role in how people view serious social issues (hence the idea of ‘cultural
cognition’). Furthermore, worldview is thought to predispose certain voters to having an
unfavorable view of CO2 emissions restriction policies, despite their level of scientific
knowledge about climate change (Kahan & Braman, 2006). This chapter includes a
statement of the problem and the purpose of the study. It concludes with a hypothesis,
research questions, definitions, assumptions, limitations, and a justification for this
research.
The purpose of this study was to analyze the role of worldview with respect to
voter outcomes in I-1631 in the November 2018 Washington State general election. This
research used an online nonprobability survey sample of Washington voters who voted in
the 2018 general election. Worldview was measured with two six-item rating scales
tested by Braman, Kahan, Peters, Wittlin, and Slovic (2012). The two scales provided a
measure of two different dimensions of worldview. Binary logistic regression modeling
1
was performed to test the relationship between individuals’ worldview and how they
voted.
The concept of cultural cognition theory is based largely on the works of Douglas
and Wildavsky, and a number of authors have used the concept of worldview and cultural
cognition theory to understand how people respond to various social issues (Dake, 1991;
Douglas, 2003; Kahan, 2007; Kahan & Braman, 2006; Wildavsky & Dake, 1990).
Chapter II will provide a review of the foundational theories.
Background
According to the Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC),
anthropogenic emissions of CO2 are the main cause of global warming and that reducing
these emissions is critical to limiting the amount of global warming the earth will
experience in the future (IPCC, 2018: Summary for Policymakers). Seventy percent of
Americans believe that global warming is occurring while 58% think that global warming
is chiefly caused by human activity (Leiserowitz, Maibach, Roser-Renouf, Rosenthal,
Cutler, & Kotcher, 2018). As a global warming mitigation measure in Washington State,
I-1631 would have placed a $15 fee per ton of emitted CO2 on many of Washington
State’s biggest emitters (Washington Initiative 1631, Carbon Emissions Fee Measure,
2018). While no state so far has implemented a carbon fee, legislatures in seven states
have received carbon fee proposals while an additional two states have considered
studying carbon taxing (Washington Initiative 1631, Carbon Emissions Fee Measure,
2018). In 2016 Washington State had another carbon tax initiative, I-732, that also failed
during the election, with approximately 59% of the voters voting no (Washington
Initiative 1631, Carbon Emissions Fee Measure, 2018).
2
During the campaign period prior to the 2018 Washington State election, there
were two political action committees that supported I-1631 and two that opposed the
initiative. The supporting committees spent approximately $16.4 million trying to get
I-1631 passed while the opposing committees spent approximately $31.5 million to
defeat the measure (Washington Initiative 1631, Carbon Emissions Fee Measure, 2018).
The opposition committees were sponsored by the Western States Petroleum Association
and the Association of Washington Business. The biggest contributor to defeating I-1631
came from BP America which provided $13.15 million (Washington Initiative 1631,
Carbon Emissions Fee Measure, 2018).
Cultural cognition theory (CCT) suggests that people tend to base their approach
on how to deal with serious social issues on their worldview which existed prior to their
learning about the social issue. In the case of climate change, I-1631 was designed to
reduce CO2 emissions in order to mitigate climate change. How people viewed the issue
may have been largely based on their worldview that existed prior to their learning about
I-1631. Since most people are not experts in climate science, they depend on others for
guidance on how to think about climate change and how to vote on I-1631. People will
likely consult those they trust for guidance on this and other important issues. They trust
people who share a similar worldview with them (Kahan & Braman, 2006). This
worldview can be measured by determining where people fall on two dimensions, the
“grid” and the “group” (Douglas, 1970). The grid measures where people fall on a
continuum between “individualist” and “communitarian,” while the other dimension,
group, measures where people fall on a continuum between “hierarchist” and
“egalitarian” (Kahan & Braman, 2006. (p. 153).
3
In any complex issue, including climate change, people may have the opportunity
to focus in on certain aspects of the issue and disregard other aspects (Douglas &
Wildavsky, 1982). People who are identified as egalitarians or communitarians tend to
focus in on the environmental risk of climate change. Those identified as individualists
tend to be concerned about how environmental regulations would affect markets or
interfere with business. Hierarchists see environmental regulations as compromising the
power of social and governmental elites (Kahan & Braman, 2006). People who are
hierarchists, for example, tend to identify with other hierarchists and will rely on them for
advice and information on most issues, including climate change. Not only that, they will
reject information and advice from the opposite group, egalitarians, who tend to have a
very differing approach to climate change. If a hierarchist, for example, might express
interest in a differing point of view, it is likely other hierarchists would censure the
straying hierarchist (Kahan & Braman, 2006).
According to Kahan and Braman (2006), empirical evidence showed “The more
egalitarian and communitarian individuals were, the more concerned they were about
global warming. . . the more hierarchical and individualistic they were, the less
concerned they were. . . Indeed, cultural worldview predicted individual beliefs about the
seriousness of these risks more powerfully than any other factor, including gender, race,
income, education, and political ideology” (p. 158).
This study analyzed Washington State residents who voted on I-1631 by asking a
number of demographic questions as well as twelve questions that provided an indication
of world view on two dimensions, the grid and the group dimensions. These worldview
questions were taken from Braman, Kahan, Gastil, Slovic, and Mertz (2007). Braman et
4
al. developed a 32-item survey designed to evaluate worldview on the two scales, the grid
(individualist-communitarian) and the group (hierarchist-egalitarian). The original grid
and group questionnaires were reduced to two six-item scales by Braman, Kahan, Peters,
Wittlin, and Slovic (2012). The short-form version is the one used in this study
(grid, α = .76 and group, α = 84) and is part of the survey found in Appendix A.
The respondents were all recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk. The survey
was administered online using Qualtrics. Qualtrics suppled an excel spreadsheet with the
results of the surveys. The total number of respondents was 648, however only 503 were
usable. If respondents indicated they did not vote on I-1631 or if they did not remember
how they voted on I-1631, they were excluded from the usable pool of respondents. The
demographic questions included: gender, age, size of community of residence, education
level, income, political party affiliation, advertising effects, general knowledge of
science, and knowledge of climate science. Two additional questions sought to determine
important reasons why respondents voted for or against I-1631. One question asked those
who voted for the initiative what was the most important reason why they voted that way.
A similar question was given to those who voted against I-1631. Results of the survey are
listed in Chapter IV while the complete survey is provided in Appendix A.
Problem Statement
I-1631 was Washington State voters’ second attempt to impose a fee on the
emissions of CO2 through a ballot initiative. Both have failed. The IPCC is unequivocal
on the need to reduce GHG emissions, yet there appears to be a reluctance on the part of
many people to move towards any meaningful attempt to restrict GHG emissions. As
such, there are no fees on CO2 in any state. The advertising that supported I-1631 tended
5
to be based on scientific findings warning people about the consequences of continued
unfettered GHG emissions. If worldview plays a significant role in how some people
view the science arguments against GHG emissions, then by understanding how
worldview works, supporters of future CO2 reduction initiatives could use this knowledge
in crafting arguments that might resonate with people whose worldview would normally
cause them to reject restrictive initiatives on CO2. By understanding how worldview
manifest itself on those who oppose restrictive initiatives, supporters of such initiatives
could devise new arguments that would convince doubters that such initiatives are in fact
worthwhile.
Research Questions and Related Hypotheses
The key research questions for this study were:
1. Are demographic characteristics (including gender, age, residence,
education, income) associated with how Washington residents voted on I-1631?
2. How does political party affiliation relate with how Washington
residents voted on I-1631?
3. Is general science knowledge as well as climate science knowledge
associated with how Washington residents voted on I-1631?
4. Is exposure to advertising associated with how Washington residents
voted on I-1631?
5. Is worldview associated with how people vote on issues involving
climate change?
6
6. Are demographics or worldview more strongly associated with how
people vote on issues involving climate change?
The research hypotheses that were tested were:
1. One or more demographic variable (gender, age, residence, education,
Income) will be related to how Washington residents voted on I-1631.
2. Political party will be related to how Washington residents voted on
I-1631.
3. Knowledge of climate science will be related to how
Washington residents voted on I-1631.
4. Voters’ worldview as measured by the Hierarchy-Egalitarianism
scale (grid) and the Individualism-Communitarianism scale (group) will be
statistically significant predictors of how they voted on I-1631.
5. Voters on the Hierarchy end of the grid scale will be more likely
to vote against I-1631 than voters at the Egalitarian end of the scale.
6. Voters on the Individualism end of the group scale will be more
likely to vote against I-1631 than voters at the Communitarian end of the scale.
7. Worldview will be more strongly related to how individuals
voted on I-1631than demographic characteristics, political party affiliation,
science knowledge, or exposure to advertising.
7
Definitions
The following terms are used in the study and the definitions that are
operationalized for this research accompany each term.
Climate change: “Climate change is a long-term shift in global or regional climate
patterns. Often climate change refers specifically to the rise in global temperatures from
the mid-20th century to present” (National Geographic).
Global warming: “Global warming is the long-term warming of the planet’s
overall temperature. Though this warming trend has been going on for a long time, its
pace has significantly increased in the last hundred years due to the burning of fossil
fuels. As the human population has increased, so has the volume of fossil fuels burned.
Fossil fuels include coal, oil, and natural gas, and burning them causes what is known as
the ‘greenhouse effect’ in Earth’s atmosphere” (National Geographic.) For the purposes
of this study, climate change and global warming are used interchangeably.
Worldview: Worldview is a construct in culture theory that posits the way people
view risks can be evaluated on two continuums, the hierarchy-egalitarianism dimension
(referred to as the grid scale), and the individualism-communitarianism dimension
(referred to as the group scale). Where people fall on these two dimensions or scales
tends to place them with like-minded individuals who share similar attitudes towards
various social risk issues. Questionnaires have been developed that place people on these
two scales and have been used in various studies (Braman et al., 2012).
8
Assumptions
The following assumptions will be made for the purposes of this study:
1. Participants in this study were residents of Washington State and voted in the
201 Washington State general election.
2. All participants understood the instrument.
3. All participants completed the instrument in an honest manner.
Limitations
The following are acknowledged as factors that may limit the generalizability of study
results:
1. The Washington State general election was conducted in November 2018. The
study was conducted in July and August 2019. Some people may not have accurately
remembered how they voted approximately nine months later.
2. Participants may have received new information since November 2018 that
may have altered perceptions or beliefs.
3. Pool of available participants was limited to Amazon Mechanical Turk
workers. This pool might not accurately reflect Washington State voters.
Justification
This study might provide insight as to whether worldview is an area worth future
study as it relates to how people vote in general elections in Washington State on issues
regarding climate change.
9
Summary
Climate change is a growing threat that continues to increase as more GHG is
released into the atmosphere each year. I-1631 was one attempt to begin to reduce
emissions of GHG. The initiative failed 55% to 45%. This study may offer one
prospective as to why voters rejected the initiative. If worldview is closely linked to
initiatives such as I-1631, this knowledge could provide a clue on how better to frame
supporting arguments that might improve the chances of future success on these
initiatives.
10
CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
The purpose of this chapter is to review the literature related to the cultural
cognition theory (CCT) and how it relates to Initiative 1631 (I-1631), the ballot measure
that sought to impose a carbon fee on most large CO2 emitters in Washington State. The
examination of CCT will serve as the theoretical background of this project. In addition,
the chapter will review the threat posed by anthropogenic climate change and the
deliberate attempt to discount anthropogenic climate change and block attempts to
regulate CO2 emissions. For many years there has been a robust and effective climate
denial industry that has successfully clouded the climate change issue in the minds of
many American (McCright & Dunlap, 2010). The final sections of chapter will review
I-1631, what it proposed to do, and provide a brief look at other carbon tax proposals.
The chapter will conclude with a brief summary.
Theoretical Foundation – Culture Cognition Theory
“Environmental problems are fundamentally social problems: they result from
human social behavior, they are viewed as problematic because of their impact on
humans, and their solution requires societal effort” (Dunlap & Marshall, 2007, p. 329).
Worldview
While scientific evidence continues to overwhelming support that climate change
is real and caused by human behavior, the American public continues to be divided on the
issue (Hamilton, Hartler, & Bell, 2019). What scientists say seems to have little impact of
the diverseness of the climate change issue (Kahan, Jenkins-Smith, & Braman, 2011). As
a theory, cultural cognition of risk provides an explanation about the public’s
11
disagreement over climate change. People tend to be selective about agreeing with or
dismissing evidence that fits in with values they share with other people (Kahan, JenkinsSmith, & Braman, 2011). People, according to cultural cognition, are disposed to
believing facts and information that they (and the people they identify with) agree with
and disbelieving facts and information they disagree with (Kahn, Braman, Monahan,
Callahan, & Peters, 2009). People tend to view the world with latent predispositions that
can have a significant effect on how they regard new information. If uncertainty arises,
people tend to seek out those with a similar worldview in order to better understand risk
issues (Kahn, 2012).
Science has provided a significant increase in the amount of information that is
available for many risk areas, including for climate change. Many people lack the time or
inclination to carefully study all available information on the subject. Individuals tend to
employ heuristics when dealing with new and abundant information such as climate
change. As a consequence, individual’s heuristics often involve seeking input from those
they trust. We tend to trust people who share a common worldview. If the new
information we encounter is consistent with our groups and our worldview, we tend to
accept it as fact while rejecting information that is contrary to our group and worldview.
Often this process will allow people to form quite confident beliefs about harm. Cultural
cognition theory suggests that the heuristic process involving risk will interact strongly
with people’s group commitments. The experts we seek for new information are the
people we consider to be credible. These experts tend to be people who have similar
worldview beliefs as we do. Culture is a significant part of the cognitive process of
people dealing with risk information (Kahan, 2007). Group identification and approval
12
can lead individuals to provide strong support for the group’s position even when the
individual may only weakly agree with the dominant position. Additionally, if individuals
disagree with the group’s position, they will likely remain silent regarding this
disagreement (Kahan & Braman, 2006).
Technologies and risks are set in a political context. This is true for both the
technologies as well as the often highly charged controversies that accompany them.
Many people take a stand either supporting technologies as important to society or see
some of these technologies as threatening the environment. This has become one of the
leading issues in contemporary society (Dake, 1991). “Worldviews. . .are inductively
derived from cultural themes observable in public and expert conflicts over technology;
they emerge from a paradigm emphasizing individual variations in the relations of
persons to their everyday social and physical environments” (Dake, 1991, p. 77).
As science has provided more and more data about risks, including climate
change, it has become harder for many people to be able to sort out fact from fiction. This
has led to a multiplication of cultural worldviews and an increased level of conflict
between groups with opposing worldviews. The mass of science data has, interestingly,
made it harder, not easier, to know and understand risks to society. However, many
people have developed very confident beliefs about risks based on their worldviews
(Kahan, 2007).
Cultural cognition suggests that people’s perception of danger is tied to their
cultural values. People tend to associate calamity with behavior they dislike while feeling
good about behavior they approve. We tend to have a feeling of trust towards those who
share the same values and distrust those who have differing values. This leads to people
13
feeling that those who have differing values are putting society at risk, cannot be trusted,
and need to be controlled (Kahan, 2007).
People tend to share beliefs about risk with their associates. They gravitate to
people and groups who have similar worldviews. This carries with it a sense of credibility
towards the members of the group. Therefore, when new information arrives, people seek
out the view of the group as many are not likely to be able to sort out credibility on their
own. If the new information is consistent with the worldview of the group, it will be
accepted. On the other hand, if new information is inconsistent with the group worldview,
the group will very likely dismiss the new information as biased and wrong (Kahan,
2007). Many risks tend to be complicated and may involve competing claims. As a result,
people often seek guidance, usually from people whose views they share, as to how to
view some new risk. The people they trust tend to be the people who share the same
worldview (Kahan, Slovic, & Braman, 2006).
According to cultural cognition, people tend to base their approach on how to deal
with serious social issues on their worldview which exists prior to their dealing with the
social issue (Kahan et al., 2009). In the case of climate change, how people view the
issues may be largely based on their worldview that existed prior to their learning about
the climate change issue. Since most people are not experts in climate science, they
depend on others for guidance on how to think about climate change. People will likely
consult those they trust for guidance on this and other important issues. They trust people
who share a similar worldview with them (Kahan & Braman, 2006). In addition, those
who might “even weakly support what appears to be the dominant view are likely to
14
express unequivocal support for it, while those who disagree will tend to mute their
opposition in order to avoid censure” (Kahan & Braman, 2006, p. 156).
Empirical evidence suggests that when people consider both the benefits and risks
of particular potentially dangerous activities, benefits and risks tend to be inversely
correlated. That is, if they value a particular activity, then they emphasize its positive
points and down play its negative aspects. Or, if they are opposed to an activity, then they
emphasize its negative aspects and disregard its pluses. They tend to be guided by
emotions that are defined by value judgments and support ties to others who share similar
feelings. Ordinary people will disagree with experts on important risk issues as well as
other lay people who do not share the same worldview (Kahan, Slovic, & Braman, 2006).
Cultural cognition refers to how individuals tend to understand risk which can be
at odds with experts in the field. In addition, experts, or sources the public may consider
to be experts, often are in disagreement on serious risk issues. This can give rise to
intense political conflict over these risk issues. The public’s interpretation of risk, their
emotional response to risk, and their comprehension of empirical information about the
risks are all part of their cultural worldview. Risk is perceived, not through expert
evaluation, but through cultural evaluation (Kahn, Slovic, & Braman, 2006). People tend
to mold their understanding of scientific facts, such as climate change, around preexisting cultural values which provides the context and cultural interpretation of these
scientific facts. Worldview can significantly contribute to how people interpret scientific
facts (DiMaggio, 1997). Since facts are cognitively interpreted through cultural position,
people are not forced “to choose between moral principle and utilitarian efficacy, for
most people, it simply never arises” (Kahan & Braman, 2006).
15
Cultural Cognition Theory is based on the cultural theory of risk developed by
Douglas and Wildavsky (1982) in which they contend that culture precedes risks, that is
people already have developed attitudes that prescribe how they are likely to react to any
new risk that may come along. “Culture is cognitively prior to facts in the sense that
cultural values shape what individuals believe the consequences of such policies to be.
Individuals selectively credit and dismiss factual claims in a manner that supports their
preferred vision of the good society” (Kahan, Slovic, & Braman, 2006, p. 1083). Douglas
and Wildavsky (1982) posit that anytime there is a scientific or technological
disagreement or controversy, the “question becomes political” (p. 65). Those who are
risk-adverse tend to view the issue as economic growth having harmed the environment.
Risk-takers, on the other hand, view the issue as having added to the quality of life and
are reluctant to reduce the material advantages just to promote a minor environmental
advantage. Risk-aversion and risk-taking are part of the worldview issue that becomes an
integral part of any political question involving technology or science.
Grid and group continuums
Douglas (2003) said that “Culture puts pressure on individuals. They don’t make
major decisions without consulting friends. The courage they have to stand up to a risk,
or to fail, or to protest, comes from their culture” (Douglas, 2003, p. 1351). Douglas
described four kinds of cultures that are identified by culture theory which are connected
on two cross-cutting continuums, the grid and the group dimensions. The grid dimension
consists of the hierarchical and egalitarian people who differ on boundaries. Hierarchists
have strong internal boundaries, they thrive on order, and pay deference to traditional
forms of social and political order. Egalitarians, on the other hand, do as they like with
16
minimal regulation. Egalitarians “are prone to factions. . . their closed community is apt
to solve its internal problems indirectly by inculcating hatred against the outside. This
leads them to see everything in dire contrasts of black and white. They become a group
unable to generate leadership and riven by factionalism” (p. 1349). Hierarchists are highgrid people who value status distinctions and feel that resource distribution ought to be
status based (e.g., class, race, gender). Low-grid people are egalitarians who reject status
distinctions and believe that all ought to share in material goods and services (Overdevest
& Christiansen, 2013, pp. 988-9).
The group dimension ranges from the low group people (individualists) who
prefer to live in a freely competitive environment to the high group people
(communitarians) who live under close and strong regulations. Individuals who hold
these differing views will separate into opposing camps, each of which tends to be certain
of the correctness of their incompatible viewpoints. High-group individuals are
communitarians who value solidarity and oppose self-interest. They see society as
interdependent and oppose competition between individuals or groups. Low-group people
believe in self-reliance and self-sufficiency and think the best society is based on
“personal ambition and competitive achievement” (Overdevest & Christiansen, 2013, pp.
989). See Figure 1, below.
17
Figure 1: Cultural worldviews: two continuums. (Kahan et al., 2007)
Douglas (2003) said that “Culture is a collective product – the outcome of efforts
to form an acceptable, workable social order” (p. 1354). These separate cultures grow and
develop based on their differing perspectives. “Culture theory looks to current
collectively shared experience. Cultures justify features of organization” (p. 1355).
“Culture theory asserts that the polarizing tendency of cultures is necessary to the cultural
process” (p. 1357). Cultural cognition theory suggests that people tend to develop
18
perceptions of risks that are consistent with groups to which they identify (Braman,
Kahan, Peters, Wittlin, & Slovic, 2012).
Douglas (1970) developed the social constructs of grid and group as a way to
better understand how worldview can affect people. The grid continuum measures how
individuals view classification. People who are low in grid (egalitarian) would tend to use
their own system of classification while those who are high in grid (hierarchist) would
use a shared system of classification with others. A high grid worldview is related to
hierarchical society in which rights, responsibilities, and rewards are allocated on
characteristics such as race, age, wealth, and gender. A low grid worldview is related to
an egalitarian society in which allocation of goods and rights is unrelated to classes such
as race, age, wealth or gender. A high group worldview tends to favor a communitarian
society in which the individual is subordinate to the collective. A low group
(individualist) worldview is a society in which each person is responsible for his or her
own wellbeing. The group continuum is similar in that people who are low in group tend
to be independent of pressure from others while those who are high in group tend to be
controlled by pressure from other people. See Figure 2, below.
19
Figure 2. Grid and Group dimensions (Douglas, 1970, p.64)
Cultural theorists have suggested some people choose what should be feared and
to what extent it should be feared in order to be consistent with their way of life. These
choices of what to fear and what not to fear form cultural biases, or worldviews, that
people will defend and that will form the patterns of their social relationships. Culture
theory suggests that hierarchists see social deviance as unacceptable because it is contrary
to superior-subordinate relationships. Individualists believe in self-regulation and see
social deviance as a problem only if it limits freedom. Individualists see nature as a
cornucopia that can provide abundance to all. Egalitarians look at nature as fragile and
believe that resources should be protected. Hierarchists support technology and business
as long as the experts have given their approval. These four different competing
worldviews account for a significant pattern of risk perception (Wildavsky & Dake,
1990).
20
In any complex issue, including climate change, people may have the opportunity
to focus in on certain aspects of the issue and disregard other aspects (Douglas &
Wildavsky, 1982). People who are identified as egalitarians or communitarians tend to
focus in on the environmental risk of climate change. Those identified as individualists
tend to be concerned about how environmental regulations would affect markets or
interfere with business. Hierarchists see environmental regulations as compromising the
power of social and government elites (Kahan & Braman, 2006). People who are
hierarchists tend to identify with other hierarchists and will rely on them for advice and
information on most issues, including climate change. Not only that, they will reject
information and advice from the opposite group, egalitarians, who tend to have a very
differing approach to climate change. If a hierarchist, for example, might express interest
in a differing point of view, it is likely other hierarchists would censure the straying
hierarchist (Kahan & Braman, 2006).
Cultural theory and global warming beliefs
According to Kahan and Braman (2006), empirical evidence showed “The more
egalitarian and communitarian individuals were, the more concerned they were about
global warming. . . the more hierarchical and individualistic they were, the less
concerned they were. . . Indeed, cultural worldview predicted individual beliefs about the
seriousness of these risks more powerfully than any other factor, including gender, race,
income, education, and political ideology” (p. 158). Based on this explanation, we might
expect those who score high in group and low in grid to support environmental initiatives
as well as those who score low in group and high in grid to oppose environmental
initiatives (Kahan & Braman, 2006, p. 158).
21
Ordinary Americans tend to view climate change from the perspective of cultural,
social, and moral processes (Dessai, Adger, Hulme, Turpenny, Kuhler, & Warren, 2004).
Experts tend to view risks from the position of probability and severity. Common people
tend to consider risks in a more complex manner including psychological and social
factors, as well as through the lens of worldview (Slovic, 2000). Research found
Americans significantly divided on the climate change issue from alarmists to naysayers,
people who believe humans will cause a climate catastrophe to people who believe that
humans have little to no influence on climate (Leiserowitz, 2005). In between the
extremes are people who view the situation as a moderate risk to people who confuse
climate risk with ozone depletion. Research has shown that egalitarians and
communitarians tended to believe climate change was an important issue while
individualists and hierarchists tend to be much less concerned about climate change
(Leiserowitz, 2005).
All four worldview groups (hierarchists, egalitarians, individualists,
communitarians) would likely agree that the government should work to make its people
secure and healthy. However, the four groups would not likely agree on how this public
policy ought to be enforced. Policy that would please one group might make another
group extremely angry. The disputes would likely be over the facts of the case, not the
values. The groups have differing interpretations of the basic facts (Peters, 2006:
Gutierrez & Giner-Sorolla, 2007). These four groups “hold sharply opposed beliefs about
a range of social risks, including those associated with climate change” (Kahan, Braman,
Slovic, Gastil, & Cohen, 2007, p. 1). The culture war in America concerns facts, not
values (Kahan, Braman, Slovic, Gastil, & Cohen, 2007, p. 16). Americans tend to care
22
about the economy, security, and health and safety (Kahan, Braman, Slovic, Gastil, &
Cohen, 2007, p. 16). While they agree that these are important issues, they strongly
disagree about what are the conditions that threaten these issues and how best to avoid
the risks (Kahan, Braman, Slovic, Gastil, & Cohen, 2007).
According to Kahan, Slovic, and Braman (2006), egalitarians (low grid) and
communitarians (high group) tend to be sensitive to environmental concerns and be
concerned about global warming. Individualists (low group) tend to dismiss
environmental concerns because these people are concerned about markets and business.
Hierarchists (high grid) tend to doubt environmental concerns because this would
question the competence of social and governmental organizations. Individualists and
hierarchists would tend to be less concerned about global warming.
Measuring worldview
The concept of cultural risk perception developed by Douglas and Wildavsky was
theoretical. Later researchers developed questionnaires to measure where individuals
placed on the grid and group dimensions. With these scales, researchers could test to see
if grid and group placement was correlated with how people view risk issues such as
environmental issues, abortion, gun control, and nuclear energy (Kahan, 2012). Braman,
et al. (2007) developed a 14-item egalitarianism-hierarchy (grid) scale (α =0.81) and a
17-item communitarianism-individualism (group) scale
(α =0.77) that were used to
see if worldview correlated with environmental risk perceptions, gun-risk perceptions,
and abortion risk perceptions. The survey was administered to 1844 individuals. As
predicted, the more hierarchical and individualistic respondents were, the less concerned
23
they were on environmental issues. The more egalitarian and communitarian the
respondents were, the more they were concerned about environmental issues. Braman, et
al. (2012) took the long version of the questionnaire and reduced it to two 6-item scales.
This short version was administered to 1540 American adults regarding climate change
perceptions. Their findings were consistent with the previous study. Those who were
identified as hierarchical or individualist had less concern for climate change while those
identified as egalitarian or communitarian showed more concern about climate change.
Each six-item scale provided reliable results: egalitarianism-hierarchy (grid) scale (α
=0.84) and communitarianism-individualism (group) scale (α =0.76). The short version
developed by Wittkin and Slovic (2012) was used in the present thesis project.
To summarize, cultural cognition theory offers three important points. First, it
supplies a reasonable theory that policy positions are related to beliefs and values. Next,
it provides a method of testing to see if values and beliefs are actually related to how
people view various risk activities. Third, the theory provides a method of understanding
these principles that people of differing vales can understand and thus can promote
diverse groups being able to work together on important public policy issues (Kahan,
Braman, Monahan, Callahan, & Peters, 2009).
Application of CCT in the climate change debate
Zinn (2016) suggested that the solution to environmental issues cannot be handled
by science alone. Rather, environmental issues require the intervention of various social
domains to effectively intervene in the natural world if long-term solutions are to occur.
As an example, environmental issues can be framed as a problem in market design. As
Zinn explained, “Economic interest and protection of the environment are often
24
considered to be contrarious forces” (p. 390). In the past, natural resources have been
considered an externality, usually with little or no associated cost. As more people realize
that there are costs associated with the usage of natural resources, they are now more
often thought of as part of the economic process. Zinn explained, “The underpinning
rationale of these debates is to marry the needs of the economy with the need of
environmental protection. For example, environmental taxes and tradable emission
permit systems have been introduced” (p. 391). Some think that the market is one way
that social allocation problems can be effectively managed where consensus is difficult
and unequal allocation is common. What is not clear is whether economic solutions will
be enough to provide adequate environmental protection.
One way that cultural cognition theory can provide a solution to the problem of
people disagreeing over facts is to provide strategies to take into account the values from
opposing worldview groups.
When policies are framed in ways that affirm rather than threaten citizens’
cultural values, people are less likely to dismiss information that runs
contrary to their prior beliefs. They are more willing to weigh and reflect
on such information in an environment in which they can see that others
who share their values find that information credible (Kahan, Braman,
Slovic, Gastil, & Cohen, 2007, p. 16).
Summary
Cultural cognition theory suggests that people’s worldview may play a significant
role in how they view social risks. Worldview usually predates learning about new risks,
such as climate change. People tend to associate with those who have similar worldviews,
and these groups can have an important effect on how people view new information as it
25
arrives. Information that is consistent with world view will usually be accepted while new
information that is contrary to worldview will be rejected (Kahan et al., 2009).
Anthropogenic Climate Change and Climate Change Denial
According to NASA, global warming is causing climate change (NASA). Climate
change denial is anti-intellectualism that is dangerous because science is clear that
anthropogenic climate change is occurring and represents a very serious threat to the
earth. Already, climate change has had dramatic effects on human and natural systems
(Peters, 2018).
Weber and Stern (2011) summarize the findings of the scientific community by
saying several conclusions are supported with a high level of confidence. These
conclusions include: the earth is warming as a result of human activity, global warming is
associated with many climate changes, these changes post a serious risk to human and
natural systems, and that climate change will continue for decades, possible centuries
(pp.315-316).
The IPCC Fifth Assessment Report (IPCC, 2014) provided a number of
significant findings. Both the atmosphere and the oceans are warming and that human
actions are the chief cause of this. The ice sheets in Antarctica and Greenland are melting
due to human caused climate change. The longer that humans wait to reduce greenhouse
gas emissions, the more expensive it will be to deal with the consequences.
Climate change is a complex issue that moves relatively slowly in terms of
individual life times. Many people who are not scientists lack a full, clear understanding
of the forces that are involved in climate change (Weber & Stern, 2011). As a
consequence, many people depend on media to help them understand climate change.
26
The media has not accurately represented the findings of science on this issue. Yet, a
good deal of media attention has covered the climate denial movement driven by the
fossil fuel industry, wealthy conservative individuals, and by conservative think tanks
(Weber & Stern, 2011). The purpose of this climate change denial movement is to
financially benefit corporations whose profits depend on fossil fuels. The result is that
many Americans have heard of these counter claims that climate change is not really
occurring, and it is it is not caused by human action. Thus, it is not surprising that many
people do not believe that climate change is a real, important issue. This leads into
worldview being a key way with which many people approach the climate change issue.
An example of how the climate change denial movement has operated can be seen by the
events of 2007 when a few errors occurred in the IPCC report. The denial movement
framed this a proof that climate change was a conspiracy by liberal politicians and grantseeking scientists. These claims were well-covered by the press and has had a significant
impact of many whose worldviews tended the doubt the honesty of liberal claims (Weber
& Stern, 2011).
Public opinion polling has assessed the state of Americans’ climate change
perceptions for decades, making it possible to see trends. Unfortunately, the issue has
clearly become more and more polarized over time. In 1997, Democrats and Republicans
were nearly united on the issue of whether climate change has already begun with 52% of
Democrats indicating the effects had begun as compared to 48% of Republicans agreeing
with this claim (Weber & Stern, 2011). Slowly but steadily, the two parties have
diverged on this issue. By 2010, 66% of Democrats indicated the effects of climate
change were underway as compared to only 32% of Republicans who felt that way
27
(Weber & Stern, 2011). Yale research noted that in 2018 91% of registered Democrat
voters thought that global warming is occurring as compared to only 52% of registered
Republican voters (Yale Program on Climate Change Communication, 2018). The longterm efforts of the climate change denial movement appear to have been effective in
convincing Republicans that climate change is not an important issue (Weber & Stern,
2011). Partisan polarization on climate change between the political parties, particularly
in Congress, is key to conflict and impedes progress on public policy over climate change
(Ballew, et al., (2019).
There is a significant disjunction between what the scientific community says
about anthropogenic climate change and what many in the public believe about climate
change. Much of this divide has been caused by the efforts of the climate change denial
movement. For many years, there has been an organized disinformation campaign
designed to spread uncertainty about anthropogenic climate change. This campaign has
been backed by the fossil fuel industry, conservative foundations, a few contrarian
scientists, and the Republican Party (Dunlap, 2013).
Risk is a part of everyday life for modern people. For many risks, including the
risk of continuing climate change, there exists deep disagreement about the problem. In
addition, different people worry about differing risks including the main categories of
foreign affairs, crime, environmental issues, and economic failure (Douglas &
Wildavsky, 1982, p. 2). The dialogue about risk will become political if there are
disagreements (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982), and the climate change dialogue has
experienced disagreements since the beginning. Ideological polarization has become a
common feature in America, and it has extended to ideological conflict over empirical
28
evidence (Kahan, 2013, p. 1). The political left and right are split over whether or not
climate change is occurring, and if it is, whether or not it is caused by human activity
(Kahan, 2013).
Conservatives have been opposing environmentalism for decades (Austin, 2002),
and conservative think tanks have had considerable success in influencing American
environmental policy making (McCright & Dunlap, 2003). Environmentalists have been
unable to halt the slide of environmental regulations under continuing pressure from
conservatives to weaken environmental protections (Kennedy, 2005).
In the United States, conservative think tanks have had a significant impact in
influencing governmental policy to oppose environmentalism. Media in the U.S. portrays
more uncertainty about anthropogenic climate change than in other advanced nations as a
result of the influence of petroleum and other industries and conservative elements. The
environmental movement’s reliance on science to promote action on climate change has
been countered by the denialists in at least three ways. First, a demand for proof has been
used by politicians to stall action. Next, scientists tend to couch findings with
probabilistic terminology, and this tentative nature of scientists does not provide the
definitive answers that common people and policy makers demand. Third, reliance on
scientific claims opens up environmentalists to counter claims provided by skeptic
scientists whose work is supported by industry (Dunlap & Marshall, 2007).
Fossil fuels companies are motivated to conceal or distract from the science on
climate change. In the 1980s, Exxon Mobil’s research indicated that carbon dioxide
released into the atmosphere by the burning of fossil fuels posed a serious risk to the
world’s climate. This research was provided to Exxon Mobile’s top executives. However,
29
the CEO of Exxon Mobile would indicate climate models were not reliable as he helped
to block action to reduce fossil fuel emissions. Exxon Mobile actively sought to spread
doubt about climate science as it worked with the Bush-Cheney White House to increase
confusion about the threat of increased carbon dioxide emissions. Exxon Mobile, after
learning about the threat to the climate from emissions decided to stop funding future
research on the subject. Instead, Exxon Mobile funded think tanks to spread doubt about
the threat of fossil fuel emissions (Insideclimatenews, 2019).
Biased television reporting together with social media and various internet
websites that presented incorrect interpretations of climate science feed into a worldview
that denies climate change (Peters, 2018). Inaction by the government on climate change
has not been accidental. Corporate lobbying and right-wing ideologues have worked
diligently for many years to keep the government from addressing the climate change
issue. The carbon lobby includes fossil fuel corporations, auto manufactures, politicians,
lobbyists, and right-wing propagandists who have worked tirelessly to deny climate
change and boost corporate profits. This carbon lobby has stalled not only action by the
U.S. Government, but has also interfered with international efforts to address the carbon
emissions issue (Hertsgaard, 2011).
During an annual meeting of the National Association of Evangelicals, there was
a struggle over the climate change issue. This association represents 30 million
evangelicals and encompasses 51 different Christian denominations. Those who felt
climate change was a serious issue that the organization ought to embrace were ousted by
those who believed that acknowledging climate change was contrary to their political
interest. By 2017, fossil-fuel funded right-wing Christians controlled the movement. At
30
the beginning of the Trump administration, this anti-climate change group held
considerable power throughout the Congress, the White House, and the EPA headed by
Scott Pruitt, a Christian fundamentalist. Conservative groups have about a billion dollars
a year to invest in countering what scientists say is happening with anthropogenic climate
change. The funding comes from pro-business billionaires and the fossil fuel industries.
Much of this money flows to think tanks, politicians, and lobbyists who are favorable to
the interests of the donors. It appears that the relationship between conservative Christian
groups and the fossil fuel industry is so strong that even conservative politicians who
believe in climate change are afraid to speak up for fear of being primaried out of a job.
This is consistent with a wing of the evangelical movement that has long been distrustful
of science and modernity (O’Connor, 2017).
This Christian worldview is decidedly pro-business, supports capitalism, and
believes that poverty comes from people not following the word of God. In their view,
the solution to the problems of the world is unfettered capitalism and that God will take
care of environmental problems (O’Connor, 2017). The environmental movement is
referred to as the “green dragon” by the religious fundamentalist organization CDR
Communications which provides biblical-based media against the environmental
movement(O’Connor, 2017, p. 5; CDR Communications, Inc.). The free market is
strongly supported by many in the evangelical movement. Some say that capitalism is
better for the environment than socialism. In fact, free markets are essential for human
welfare as it is the closest approximation that man has come to the teachings of the Bible
(O’Connor, 2017). The net result is that the billions and billions that the fossil fuel
industry and wealthy business interests have poured into anti-climate change rhetoric has
31
paid off by stopping the government from any meaningful action on climate change, and
the religious right has become an important part of the resistance to effective
environmental action (O’Connor, 2017).
Organized Climate Denial
In spite of climate scientists being clear that anthropogenic climate change is a
serious threat to the world, many people think there is a debate about climate change or
that it is not a problem (Schultz, 2013). The confusion behind the facts and the beliefs lie
in a well-funded climate change-denial movement. The think tanks, trade associations,
and advocacy organizations that make up the climate change denial movement are funded
by individuals and businesses that profit by preventing action against climate change
(Schultz, 2013). Many of the tactics the climate change denial movement uses so
successfully to thwart action on climate change are similar to how the tobacco industry
years before was able to cloud the issue link between smoking and various health issues
for many years (Schultz, 2013).
McCright and Dunlop (2010) argue that the American conservative movement has
systematically and conscientiously attacked science in order to protect business and
industry. One way this has occurred is by challenging the legitimacy of science,
particularly impact science. As social movements have arisen that have spelled out the
unintended consequences of production science, impact science has looked into these
consequences and spelled out their danger to the environment. The conservative
movement since the Reagan administration has supported the value of production science
and questioned the legitimacy of impact science. The public has been swayed through
ideology and propaganda which has led to inaction by the government in dealing with the
32
findings of impact science in general and climate science in particular. Republican
members of Congress have been particularly effective in supporting business and
industry against the claims of impact science, so much so that the Federal Government is
currently doing virtually nothing regarding climate change issues. Generally, this has
been accomplished through legislators attacking scientific evidence that anthropogenic
climate change is occurring all the while claiming to be environmentally friendly and
environmentally motivated. Conservative legislators have used this tactic in order to
protect the industrial capitalist order. The conservative movement’s chief tactics have
included four effective techniques. According to McCright and Dunlop, they have “(1)
obfuscated, misrepresented, manipulated and suppressed the results of scientific research;
(2) intimidated or threatened to sanction individual scientists; (3) invoked existing rules
or created new procedures in the political system; and (4) invoked an existing bias of the
media” (2010, p. 111).
The George W. Bush administration promoted fringe science that disagreed with
the widely accepted finding of the vast majority of climate scientists. The majority of
fringe scientists who argued that climate change was no problem were receiving funds
from various conservative think tanks or similar organizations (McCright and Dunlop,
2010). The Bush administration misrepresented and ignored reports that found climate
change to be a serious threat as well as manipulated scientific research from government
agencies. The administration attacked individual scientists whose research indicated
climate science is a threat and filled agency positions with political appointees with
strong partisan credentials. The administration changed rules making it much harder for
science to emerge that supported climate change findings (McCright and Dunlop, 2010).
33
Conservative members of Congress have held hearings that were clearly pre-determined
to deny climate change. The conservative movement has been skilled at the natural
tendency of the news media to air both sides of an issue making the few fringe scientists
who dispute climate change appear to equal the scientists who have found that climate
change is real and a serious threat (McCright and Dunlop, 2010). When research finds
that many Americans are undecided about climate change or deny it exists, it is based on
the effectiveness of the American conservative movement in controlling the dialogue for
that very purpose. “Clearly, the American conservative movement has been a powerful
counterforce to the environmental movement” (McCright and Dunlop, 2010, p. 126).
Carroll, Graham, Lang, Yunker, and McCartney (2018) found that the fossil fuels
corporations have had a significant control over both civil and political society “with
generally debilitating implications for democracy” (p. 426). Corporations continue to
push for ever increasing extraction and usage of fossil fuels. The fossil fuel industries
form an important part of the denial approach that argues against the scientific findings of
anthropogenic climate change (Carroll, et al. 2018). In order to promote profit, the
industries invoke three common strategies aimed at promoting their supposed concern for
the environment. First, they claim that they are developing more efficient extraction and
consumption techniques. Next, they claim there are new technologies that will alleviate
the problem. Finally, the extraction and consumption industries argue that incremental
change will be sufficient to deal with the problem when this is not accurate (Carroll, et al.
2018). There is a single, connected network of fossil fuel corporations devoted to
influencing both the government and society and that they are working in the best interest
of their primary methods involve lobbying, advertising, and various means of persuasive
34
communications. Many lawmakers have taken up the denialism of the fossil fuel
industries and deny the scientific findings concerning the threat of climate change. The
fossil fuel industries talk as though they are dealing with climate change issues while at
the same time promoting practices designed to increase profits (Carroll, et al. 2018).
Corporations would have the public believe they are taking common sense actions
regarding the issue while actually continuing to push for unrestricted fossil fuel usage and
maximum industry profits (Carroll, et al. 2018).
In summary, confusion by the American public over whether or not anthropogenic
climate change is occurring has been no accident. This confusion has been the result of
years of contrary information provided by the climate change denial movement financed
by wealthy individuals and corporations whose motive is to maximize profits of the fossil
fuel industries. The net result of the efforts of the climate change denial movement is that
the American public has heard competing claims regarding climate change for decades,
and that has created the opportunity for worldview to be a significant player in how many
people regard climate change.
Carbon Pricing and Initiative 1631 (I-1631)
According to The World Bank Group (2019), carbon pricing is “recognized as an
essential instrument to cost-effectively deliver the transition to low-carbon societies”
(p.8). However, gaining support for carbon pricing is difficult even though “carbon
pricing is the most effective way to reduce emissions” (p. 3). In 2019 approximately 20%
of GHG emissions worldwide were covered by carbon pricing while only about 5% were
covered at a sufficient rate in order to reach the goals set out by the Paris Agreement.
About 52% of the countries that signed the Paris Agreement have begun to institute
35
carbon pricing or intend to do so. The U.S. is not one of those countries. There have been
some states in the U.S. that are considering carbon pricing including California, Oregon,
and New Mexico (p. 9).
I-1631 was Washington State’s second attempt to impose a carbon fee. In 2016
another carbon fee, I-732, was also rejected by Washington State voters. 59% voting
against the initiative (Smith, 2018). Interestingly, some of the strongest opposition to I732 came from environmental groups such as the Sierra Club and the League of
Conservation voters. These groups opposed I-732 since the most of the proceeds from the
initiative would have been used for taxpayer rebates (Leber, 2018).
Background on I-1631
Initiative 1631 (I-1631) appeared on the ballot in Washington State during the
2018 general election. Had it passed, starting on January 1, 2020, there would have been
a $15 fee per metric ton of emitted carbon placed on many larger emitters in Washington
State. There would have been an increase of $2 per metric ton each year after that until
the greenhouse gas reduction goals for 2035 were met. The revenue from this fee would
have gone into three different funds. One fund would have supported air quality and
energy programs. A second fund would have provided support for water quality and
forest projects. The third fund would have provided community support. I-1631 was
referred to as a fee rather than a tax since the revenue would have been spent on these
three specific projects and would not have gone into the general state treasury for
government expenses (Ballotpedia.org, 2018).
36
Support
There were two committees that registered as supporters of I-1631: Clean Air
Clean Energy WA and Fuse Voters. Clean Air Clean Energy WA reported that it received
$16.4 million in contributions and spent the total amount in support of I-1631. Its largest
donor was Nature Conservancy which provided $3.4 million. Bill Gates and Michael
Bloomberg each provided $1 million (Ballotpedia.org, 2018).
Opposition
Two committees registered in opposition to I-1631: No on 1631 and I-1631. The
Western States Petroleum Association registered No on 1631 while the Association of
Washington Business sponsored I-1631. Together, the two opposition groups raised
$31.6 million and spent $31.5 million is efforts to defeat the initiative. The Western
States Petroleum Association raised by far the larger amount (Ballotpedia.org, 2018).
Five companies donated more than $1 million each: BP America ($12.9 million), Phillips
66 ($7.2 million), Andeavor ($4.4 million), Marathon ($1.7 million), and American Fuel
and Petrochemical Manufactures ($1.2 million) (Western States Petroleum Association,
2018).
Main Arguments
Supporters tended to claim that I-1631 would create jobs and reduce pollution.
This would improve air and water quality and would save natural resources. The
opponents claimed that gasoline and energy costs would go up, jobs would be lost, and
that the initiative would have no effect on global carbon emissions (Ballotpedia.org,
2018).
37
Other Carbon Reduction Efforts
Cultural Cognition Theory and I-1631
Prior research provides possible clues as to what to expect in this study of how
people in Washington voted on I-1631 and their voting patterns as related to CCT.
Different authors found worldview to be a powerful predictor on how people view risk
behavior. Kahan, et al. (2006) found that political ideology, income, education, gender,
ethnicity, religion, and community type tended to relate to attitudes towards risk
behavior. However, cultural worldview was a stronger predictor than were any of these
other factors. Kahan and Braman (2006) found that “cultural worldview predicted
individual beliefs about the seriousness of these risks more powerfully than any other
factor, including gender, race, income education, and political ideology” (p. 158). Kahan
(2012) stated that cultural worldview explains variation better than any other tested factor
including ideology. Kahan, et al. (2007) found that, “Individuals’ worldviews . . .
explained individuals’ beliefs about global warming more powerfully than any other
individual characteristic” (p. 4). The authors stated than how liberal or conservative
people were, “explained less than one-third as much of variance in such beliefs as did”
cultural world view (p. 4).
Summary
This chapter started with a review of cultural cognition theory (CCT) and how it
relates to climate change and I-1631. This was the theoretical background of the project.
Next, the chapter reviewed the seriousness of the threat of anthropogenic climate change
followed by the ongoing deliberate attempt to discredit climate change as a real and
38
pressing issue. The chapter concluded with a brief review of I-1631 and other attempts to
institute carbon taxing efforts.
39
CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY
This chapter provides the method by which this study investigated whether there
was a statistical relationship between worldview and how Washington State voters voted
on a carbon fee initiative (I-1631) during the November 2018 general election. The study
also analyzed the relationship between how people voted on I-1631 and the following
demographic characteristics: gender, where people live, age, size of community voters
live in, education, income, and political party. The study analyzed individuals’ exposure
to advertising, knowledge of science in general, and knowledge of climate science. This
chapter provides the details on how the survey was conducted, who the participants were,
and how the data were. analyzed
To measure worldview, this research used cultural theory (Dake, 1991; Douglas,
2003; Kahan, 2007; Kahan & Braman, 2006; Wildavsky & Dake, 1990) and borrowed
two 6-qestion scales from Braman et al. (2012) which measure two dimensions of
worldview, the egalitarianism-hierarchy scale (grid) and the individualismcommunitarianism scale (group).
Research Design
This study used an online nonprobability survey sample (n = 503) of Washington
State voters. The survey was administered during late July and early August 2019, and
respondents were recruited using Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). All respondents
were required to take a 29-question survey, which included a variety of demographic,
political, worldview, and other questions related to I-1631. Please see Appendix A for the
full survey instrument. The responses to the survey supplied all data that were analyzed
40
in this study. A total of 503 respondents successfully completed the questions on the
survey and were used for analysis.
The research hypotheses that were tested were:
1. One or more demographic variable (gender, age, residence, education,
income) will be related to how Washington residents voted on I-1631.
2. Political party will be related to how Washington residents voted on
I-1631.
3. Knowledge of climate science will be related to how Washington
residents voted on I-1631.
4. Voters’ worldview as measured by the Hierarchy-Egalitarianism scale
(grid) and the Individualism-Communitarianism scale (group) will be statistically
significant predictors of how Washington residents voted on I-1631.
5. Voters on the Hierarchy end of the grid scale will be more likely to vote
against I-1631 than voters at the Egalitarian end of the scale.
6. Voters on the Individualism end of the group scale will be more likely
to vote against I-1631 than voters at the Communitarian end of the scale.
7. Worldview will be more strongly related to how individuals voted on
I-1631 than demographic characteristics, political party affiliation, science
knowledge, or exposure to advertising.
41
Respondents
Respondents were recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). Once
identified, respondents were directed to complete the survey on Qualtrics. Respondents
received a code at the end of the survey which they used on MTurk to receive pay, $2.00
per respondent. MTurk can restrict respondents to particular category. In this case, only
people who were registered with address in Washington State were recruited by MTurk
to be respondents. Control procedures were used to increase the likelihood of recruiting
only Washington State residents who voted in the 2018 election and who voted on the I1631 initiative. Question 1 was: “Do you live in Washington State?” A “No” answer
would have automatically ended the session with Qualtrics. Question 2 was: “Did you
vote in Washington State in the 2018 general election?” A “No” answer would again
have immediately ended the session on Qualtrics. Question 3 was: “In the 2018 general
election, how did you vote on initiative 1631?” Possible answers included: “For,”
“Against,” “I did not vote on initiative 1631,” and “I do not remember how I voted on
initiative 1631.” Only respondents who recorded a “For” or an “Against” were allowed to
continue by Qualtrics. Between the filter on MTurk and the first three questions on
Qualtrics, it is highly likely all or nearly all of the respondents who successfully
completed the survey were actually Washington State residents who voted on I-1631 in
November 2018. In addition, MTurk provided the location address for respondents. I
eliminated all respondents whose IP address was not within Washington State. Between
the screening questions and elimination of respondents who took the survey outside of
Washington State, it is likely that most or all respondents were actually Washington State
residents.
42
Instrumentation
The cultural cognition scales discussed in the previous chapter have been used for
research for several years. As a reminder, these consists of two scales, one for measuring
hierarchy-egalitarianism (grid) and the other for individualism-communitarianism
(group). The full form grid scale consists of 13 questions while the group scale consists
of 17 items (Kahan et al. 2007). More recently the original cultural cognition scales have
been reduced to two 6-question scales taken from the original longer sets of questions.
The present study used the short form, consisting of two 6-item scales. A Cronbach’s
alpha was calculated for the 6 items on the grid scale and the 6 items on the group scale,
and both were more than acceptable at alpha of: 0.84 for the hierarchy-egalitarianism
(grid) scale, and alpha of 0.76 for the individualism-communitarianism (group) scale
(Braman et al., 2012). The response options for both used a four-point Likert 1 to 4.
Implementation of the Study
The study was conducted with permission of The Evergreen State College Human
Subjects Board (Appendix B). Those who qualified were given a link to Qualtrics where
the actual survey was placed. Once the survey was complete, Qualtrics provided an Excel
spreadsheet with all data.
Analytical Strategy
The statistical software program, JMP, was used to calculate descriptive statistics
and to perform binary logistic regression. In the regression analysis, voting on I-1631 was
used as the dependent while gender, age, size of community, education level, income,
political party, effects of advertising, knowledge of general science, knowledge of
climate science, grid, and group were used as the eleven independent variables.
43
Summary
This chapter provided the methodology by which worldview was measured using
the two cultural cognition scales and how 503 residents of Washington State were
selected to participated in this study. The next chapter presents the results of the logistic
regression models, which highlight how various predictor variables relate with how
people voted on the I-1631 carbon fee initiative.
44
CHAPTER IV
RESULTS
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the results of the study conducted on
voter choice with respect to I-1631. This study analyzed 503 Washington State voters
who completed a survey through Amazon Mechanical Turk and Qualtrics. The unit of
analysis was the individual survey respondent. The survey asked how respondents voted
on I-1631 and 26 additional questions involving demographics and worldviews. The
analysis includes both descriptive statistics as well as binary logistic regression, the latter
of which was used to investigate relationships between voting on I-1631 and the various
demographics as well as how voting related to worldview. The results of the analyses are
provided in the following sections.
Statistical Analyses
Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics were computed for both the dependent variable, (voting on I1631) and for the 11 independent variables. In addition, descriptive statistics were also
computed for two additional variables that were not tested in the regression analysis: one
question asked those who voted for I-1631 why they voted that way while another
question did the same for those who voted against I-1631.
Demographic results and cross tabulations by voting are reported in Table 1.
Slightly more females than males responded (52.5% females versus 47.5% males).
Nearly 70% of respondents were 39 or younger with about 30% being 40 or older. Over
half were residents of cities of 50,001 or greater (56%) while 44% lived in towns of
50,000 or fewer residents. Slightly over 50% had bachelors or graduate degrees while just
over 10% had a high school diploma, GED, or less. Slightly over 52% reported earning
45
$50,00 or less, nearly 34% earned between $50,001 and $100,000, and 14% reported
earning in excess of $100,000 per year. Slightly over 48% were Democrats, 35% were
independents, and only 14.5% reported themselves as Republicans.
In addition to the items concerning demographic factors, three additional
questions sought responses regarding how advertising may have affected respondents’
votes and how knowledge of general science and of climate science may have influenced
voting on I-1631. Results of these three questions are also found in Table 1, below. A
little over 55% of the participants indicated that advertising had no effect on how they
voted while over 44% said advertising had a little, quite a bit, or a great deal of influence
on how they voted. Almost 5% said they had only low or very low knowledge of science
in general while 10% indicated they had low or very low knowledge of climate science.
While 43.5% said they had an average knowledge of science in general, almost 54% said
they had average knowledge of climate science. Slightly over half, 51.7%, indicated
above average or very high knowledge of science in general while only 36% said they
had above average or very high knowledge of climate science.
46
Table 1 – Descriptive statistics and cross tabulations by voting behavior
Variable
Gender
Categories
Male
Female
N
233
258
%
47.5%
52.5%
For
117
165
Age
18-29
30-39
40-49
50-59
60-69
70 and up
175
175
78
50
19
6
34.8%
34.8%
15.5%
9.9%
3.2%
1.2%
107
97
41
28
13
3
68
78
37
22
3
3
Population
Of
Rural
Up to 10,000
50
59
9.9%
11.7%
21
36
29
23
10,001-50,000
111
22.1%
61
50
50,001-100,000
128
25.4%
78
50
100,001- 1,000,000
155
30.8%
93
62
Residence
Against
116
93
Education
Less than HS
HS or GED
Some college
BS/BA
Graduate Degree
4
49
195
198
57
0.8%
9.7%
38.8%
39.4%
11.3%
3
28
109
112
37
1
21
86
86
20
Income
$0-$25,000
$25,001-$50,000
$50,001-$75,000
$75,001-$100,000
$100,001-$125,000
$125,001-$150,000
$150,001 and up
99
163
118
51
47
12
11
19.8%
32.5%
23.6%
10.2%
9.4%
2.4%
2.2%
67
88
65
32
22
9
5
32
75
53
19
25
3
6
47
Party
Democrat
Republican
Independent
Other
244
73
178
8
48.5%
14.5%
35.4%
1.6%
184
25
74
6
60
48
104
2
Advertising
No influence
Some influence
278
225
55.3%
44.7%
167
122
111
103
General
Science
Very low
Low
Average
Above Average
Very high
2
22
219
208
52
0.3%
4.4%
43.5%
41.4%
10.3%
0
11
116
130
32
2
11
103
78
20
Climate
Science
Very low
Low
Average
Above Average
Very high
5
46
271
150
31
1.0%
9.1%
53.9%
29.8%
6.2%
0
17
146
108
18
5
29
125
42
13
As Figure 3, below, shows, a little over 57% of the respondents voted for I-1631
as compared to the actual election during which about 45% voted for I-1631. This
represents a 12% difference between the survey sample and the actual election.
48
Voting on I-1631
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
For
Against
Figure 3: Voting on I-1631. For: 289 Against: 214
Respondents who voted for I-1631 were asked to provide the main reason for
their vote. Half of those who voted for the initiative felt that I-1631 “would have been a
small step in the right direction to reduce climate change.” An additional 34% mentioned
greenhouse gas emissions and global warming as their main reasons for supporting I1631. Altogether, nearly 85% of supporters provided reasons linked to climate change.
Only two respondents mentioned either advertising or opinions of friends as being the
main reason for their support. Results are in Table 2, below.
49
Table 2: Main reasons for voting for I-1631
N
%
145
50.2
change
53
18.3
47
16.3
16
5.5
15
5.2
11
3.8
emissions
1
0.3
1
0.3
0
0.0
Reason
It would have been a small step in the right direction to reduce climate
It would have helped to reduce greenhouse gas emissions
Global warming is a serious threat
It would have helped many important programs in Washington State
It would have hurt some of the biggest polluters
Washington State would have become the leader in reducing GHG
Advertising convinced me to vote for I-1631
People I know supported I-1631
Other
Respondents who voted against I-1631 were asked to indicate the main reason
they opposed the initiative. Four of the top five reasons respondents provided for voting
against I-1631 were main talking points that advertising against I-1631 mentioned
frequently leading up to the November 2018 election. Advertising continually hit on the
themes of taxes, exempt emitters, harm to poor people, and a job loss as what I-1631
would entail. Although only 5 respondents said advertising was the main reason they
voted against I-1631, it may be likely that advertising was successful in providing
specific objections to I-1631 that resonated with many voters. Thirteen respondents
marked “Other” as their main reason for rejecting I-1631. It would be interesting to know
what those reasons were. Results are displayed in Table 3, below.
50
Table 3: Main reasons for voting against I-1631
N
%
Reason
90
42.1 I oppose new taxes
35
16.4 I support the concept but did not like that some large emitters were exempt
33
15.4 I support the concept but felt that I-1631 was not well-written
24
11.2 It would have harmed poor people
13
6.1 It would have caused a loss of jobs
13
6.1 Other
5
2.3 Advertising convinced me to vote against I-1631
1
0.6 People I know opposed I-1631
Gender was a significant factor in how respondents voted on I-1631. Figure 4,
below, shows that 65% of females voted for I-1631 while males were almost exactly split
between voting for and against the initiative (117 for vs. 116 against). Respondents
included 233 males, 258 females, and 12 who did not identify or who selected nonbinary.
Voting by Gender
180
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
Male
Female
For
Figure 4: Voting by gender
51
Against
Where respondents lived showed some significance in how they voted. The rural
dwellers were 58% against versus 42% in favor of I-1631. Generally, as the size of the
community increased, so did the rate at which respondents voted for I-1631. Nearly 31%
of all respondents lived in a city larger than 100,000, and 60% of them voted in favor of
I-1631. Please see Figure 5, below.
Voting by Population of Residence
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Rural
Up to 10,000
10,001-50,000
For
50,001-100,000
> 100,000
Against
Figure 5: Voting by population of residence
Party affiliation was a significant factor in how respondents voted on I-1631.
Democrats voted for I-1631 overwhelmingly (75%) while 60% of Republicans,
independents, and others voted against I-1631. Please see Figure 6, below.
52
Vote by Party
200
150
100
50
0
For
Against
Figure 6: Voting by party affiliation
Self-reported knowledge of climate science was significantly linked to voting.
Respondents who rated their knowledge of climate science to be low or very low were
more likely to vote against I-1631 while those who rated themselves as having average,
above average, or very high knowledge of climate science were more likely to vote for I1631. Sixty percent of those whose knowledge of climate science was average or above
voted in favor of I-1631. Please see Figure 7, below.
Voting by Climate Science Knowledge
200
150
100
50
0
Very low
Low
Average
For
Above
average
Very high
Against
Figure 7: Voting by knowledge of climate science
53
Binary logistic regression modeling was used due to the binary nature of the
dependent variable (for/against I-1631). A cumulative modeling approach was used to
separately examine the effects of different predictor variables. Four models were
estimated, and the results are presented in Table 4, below. The first regression model,
Model 1, included gender, age, population of respondent’s community, education level,
and income as predictors. The significant findings were that males were less likely than
females (6.53, p < 0.05) to vote for I-1631 and rural residents (5.53, p < 0.05) were less
likely to vote for I-1631 than were residents of large cities. Age, education, and income
showed no significant effects on I-1631 voting.
The second regression model, Model 2, added party affiliation. Those identifying
as Republican (4.38, p < 0.05) were significantly less likely to vote for I-1631 than were
those who identified as Democrats. The third regression model, Model 3, added
respondents’ knowledge of general science, respondents’ knowledge of climate science,
and effects of advertising. Knowledge of science in general had no effect while
knowledge of climate science (9.83, p < 0.001) showed that the less knowledge
respondents had of climate science, the more likely they were to vote against I-1631.
Advertising showed no significant results.
The final model, Model 4, added the primary research focus for this study. The
results suggest that as individuals’ grid scores move towards the hierarchy end of the
continuum of the scale and away from the egalitarian end, respondents were significantly
more likely to vote against I-1631 (36.99, p < 0.0001). As group scores moved away
from the communitarianism end of the continuum towards the individualism end,
54
respondents were significantly more likely to vote against I-1631 (12.41, p <001). Both
of these findings were consistent with prior research.
The pseudo R2 f values for the four models in order were: 0.03, 0.12, 0.16, and
0.27, which suggests that of the significant predictor variables (gender, residency
population, party, knowledge of climate science, grid, and group), grid and group
accounted for the most variance in the dependent variable, while party also showed an
important role in how respondent voted. In fact, the R2 values for the four models suggest
that worldview was the most important factor of those investigated in determining how
respondents voted on I-1631. These findings support the cultural cognition thesis that
worldview is a significant predictor of how people vote on serious risk issues, even
greater than the effect of political party. This will be discussed at length in the following
chapter.
55
Table 4: Binary logistic regression predicting voting behavior
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Est(SE)Sig
Gender
Age
Income
Residence(Large
City)
Rural
Small Town
Large Town
Small City
Education(Grad
Deg)
Less than HS
HS or GED
Some College
Bachelors Degree
Party (Democrat)
Other
Independent
Republican
Advertising
General Science
Climate Science
Grid
Group
.30(.09)*** .26(10)*
-.05(.08)
-.03(.09)
-.08(.07)
-.01(.07)
.36(.11)**
.02(.09)
-.03(.08)
.31(.12)*
.06(.10)
-.04(.09)
-.67(.26)**
.25(.24)
.25(.24)
.02(.19)
-.53(.27)
.38(.26)
-.21(.20)
.20(.19)
-.51(.28)
.42(.26)
-.19(.21)
.18(.20)
-.47(.32)
.70(.30)*
-.21(.23)
.07(.22)
-1.07(1.25)
-.09(.34)
.11(.21)
.30(.32)
1.43(1.31)
-.34(.38)
.07(.23)
.18(.35)
-2.38(1.46)
-.40(.39)
.03(.24)
.02(.36)
-2.89(1.58)
-.65(.43)
.01(.26)
-.17(.38)
-.39(.25)
-.40(.26)
-.22(.18)
-.20(.18)
.58(.22)** -.54(.23)*
-.15(.14)
-.04(.19)
.67(.20)***
-.58(.28)*
-.10(.21)
.44(.28)
-.17(.15)
-.02(.20)
.65(.21)**
.21(.03)***
.13(.04)***
n
489
483
483
483
R2
AIC
.03
670
.12
608
.16
593
.27
521
Sig <.05 = *
<.01 = **
<.001 = ***
56
Summary
The results of this study analyzed the responses of 503 people who voted in the
2018 Washngton State general election. It provided support for the hypothesis that
worldview is a significant predictor for how people vote on serious social issues, in this
case how people voted on I-1631. Gender, size of community, and political party all
showed predictive statistical significance. However, worldview showed the strongest
predictive power and supported the hypothesis that worldview is consequential for how
people vote on critical social issues.
57
CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Climate change is a critical issue and anthropogenic CO2 emissions are the chief
cause (IPCC), Instituting a carbon fee on large emitters may be one way of reducing CO2
emissions. This thesis centers on the carbon fee initiative that appeared on the 2018
Washington State ballot in the general election, known as I-1631, which was voted down
55% to 45%. This study attempted to determine what factors played a role in how
residents of Washington State voted on I-1631, with worldview being the central focus of
this analysis. Understanding how worldview is linked to voting on serious risk issues
might provide insight into how supporters of future carbon fee initiatives might better
present arguments for gaining support for these ballot measures.
Research into cultural cognition theory (CCT) has suggested that worldview may
play a larger role into how citizens vote on climate change issues than demographic
factors or even political party affiliation (Kahan and Braman, 2006). Climate change is a
complex issue with strong opinions and assertions on both sides of the issue. The average
voter is not an expert on the issue, and so the voter’s worldview may play an important
role in how the various arguments, both for and against, are accepted or rejected. People
will seek information from those who share a similar worldview while rejecting
arguments from those who have differing worldviews (Kahan, 2007).
As a global warming mitigation measure in Washington State, I-1631 would have
placed a $15 fee per ton of emitted CO2 on many of Washington State’s biggest emitters
(Washington Initiative 1631, Carbon Emissions Fee Measure, 2018). While no state so
far has implemented a carbon fee, legislatures in seven states have received carbon fee
58
proposals while two additional states have considered studying carbon taxing
(Washington Initiative 1631, Carbon Emissions Fee Measure, 2018). In 2016 Washington
State had another carbon tax initiative, I-732, that also failed during the election, with
approximately 59% of the voters voting no (Washington Initiative 1631, Carbon
Emissions Fee Measure, 2018).
Cultural cognition suggests that people’s perception of danger is tied to their
cultural values. People tend to associate calamity with behavior they dislike while feeling
good about behavior they approve. We tend to have a feeling of trust towards those who
share the same values and distrust those who have differing values. This leads to people
feeling that those who have differing values are putting society at risk, cannot be trusted,
and need to be controlled (Kahan, 2007).
This study investigated whether world view of 503 Washington State voters was
statistically related to demographics, political party, knowledge of climate science, and
exposure to advertising. Cultural worldview was measured using two six-question scales
(Kahan et al., 2007). Predictors of voting behavior on I-1631 were analyzed using
ordered logistic regression including cultural worldview, voter demographics, political
party affiliation, climate science knowledge, and exposure to advertising. This study
investigated seven hypotheses involving worldview as it relates to demographics,
political party, knowledge of climate science, and exposure to advertising. Each of these
is discussed in relation to study results below.
Major Findings
Analyses of the relationship between eleven independent variables and voting
behavior on I-1631 demonstrated that while gender, population of residence, political
59
party affiliation, and knowledge of climate science were predictive regarding how people
voted on I-1631, the strongest predictor was worldview.
Findings Related to the Research Hypotheses
1. One or more demographic variables (gender, age, income, population of
residence, education) will be related to how Washington residents voted on I-1631.
Three of the five variables (age, income, education) failed to be predictive of how
people voted on I-1631. Rural voters tended to vote against I-1631 while urban voters
favored I-1631. Gender showed a clear pattern with males being more likely than females
to vote against I-1631. Males were split on how they voted on I-1631 (117 for versus 116
against) as comparted to female respondents who favored I-1631 by 64% for and 36%
against. Across all four models, gender played a significant role. Gender appeared to be a
variable worth noting for those who may prepare advertising for future initiative voting.
2. Political party will be related to how Washington residents voted on I-1631.
This study found that 75% of those who identified as Democrat voted for I-163,
66% of those who identified as Republican voted against I-1631, and 58% of those who
identified as independent voted against I-1631. In the regression models, party affiliation
was a significant predictor of how citizens voted on I-1631. This study suggests that
Democrats were much more likely to support I-1631 while Republicans and independents
were more likely to oppose I-1631. However, once cultural worldview was added to the
regression model, the strength of the political party effect was significantly reduced and
Republican versus Democrat was not statistically significant while Independents showed
only a small effect.
60
3. Knowledge of climate science will be related to how Washington residents
voted on I-1631.
While knowledge of science in general showed no effect, self-identified
knowledge of climate science showed a significant predictive effect. As the knowledge
level of climate science increased, voters were more likely to support I-1631. Those who
indicated they had a “very low” or “low” knowledge of climate science voted 17 for and
34 against I-1631. Those who said they had an “average”, “above average,” or “very
high” knowledge of climate science voted 272 for I-1631 and 180 against. While no
attempt was made to actually determine respondent level of climate science and the
categories were left open for individual interpretation, the study suggests that the more
people know about climate science knowledge the more likely they are to support efforts
to control carbon emissions.
4. Voters’ worldview as measured by the Hierarchy-Egalitarianism scale (grid)
and the Individualism-Communitarianism scale (group) will be statistically significant
predictors of how they voted on I-1631.
This study found that worldview was the factor that was the strongest predictor
for how people voted on I-1631.
5. Voters on the Hierarchy end of the grid scale will be more likely to vote against
I-1631 than voters at the Egalitarian end of the scale.
This study supported the contention that people on the hierarchy end of the grid
scale would tend to vote against I-1631 while those at the Egalitarian would be more
likely to vote for I-1631.
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6. Voters on the Individualism end of the group scale will be more likely to vote
against I-1631 than voters at the Communitarian end of the scale.
This study found that voters who were at the individualism end of the group scale
were more likely to vote against I-1631 while those at the communitarian end of the scale
were more likely to vote for I-1631.
7. Worldview will be more strongly related to how individuals voted on I-1631
than demographic characteristics, political party affiliation, climate science knowledge,
or exposure to advertising.
This study found that worldview as measured by the grid and group scales was a
stronger predictor on how people voted than any of the demographic variables, political
party affiliation, advertising, or knowledge of climate science. Findings of this study are
consistent with earlier studies (Kahan, Slovic, & Braman, 2006; Leiserowitz, 2005;
Wildavsky & Marshall, 2007), However, perhaps a more essential point is what this
means for future initiatives that propose to limit or reduce carbon emissions. Zinn (2016)
provides one possible learning point. It may be possible to develop arguments for carbon
reduction that are consistent with a Hierarchy or Individualism worldview. Supporters of
carbon reduction will have to expand their science-based arguments to include, for
example, economic arguments that would be appealing to those with an opposing
worldview. In addition to arguing that carbon reduction will clean up the air, supporters
could make a strong case for the economic benefits or the national security benefits of
carbon reduction. By looking at the issue from the hierarchy or individualism perspective,
supporters can frame arguments that will appeal to those whose worldview might cause
them to normally be opposed to carbon reduction.
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Limitations
All 503 participants in this study were recruited through Amazon Mechanical
Turk. Since every participant shared in common participation in Turk, this may have
limited diversity in unknown ways. Additionally, it is worth noting that in this study, 289
respondents (57%) voted for I-1631 versus 214 (43%) who voted against I-1631. This
might suggest that people willing to participate in this study were more likely to vote in
favor of climate legislation, which could skew the results.
Additional Results
This study measured various reasons why participants voted for or against I-1631.
These measures were not included in the statistical analysis. However, the results may be
of interest. Two sets of questions were developed based on my recollection of the
advertising for and against I-1631. No one selected the option “Other” for those who
voted for I-1631, and 13 selected “Other” from the group who voted against I-1631. We
can assume that the options that were provided tended to reflect most participants’
reasons for voting as they did. Only six total (1 from the for group and 5 from the against
group). selected the option “Advertising convinced me to vote (for/against) I-1631 out of
a total of 503 total participants. Since only about one percent of the respondents indicated
advertising caused them to vote the way they did, we might assume advertising played
only a very small role in the outcome. When we consider that the questions tended to
reflect the key features of the advertising campaigns, it might be possible to consider that
advertising’s role was more significant than the six votes imply. Five who indicated
advertising was their chief reason for voting as they did against I-1631out of a total of
214 who voted against the measure. Four of the top five reasons people selected as why
63
they voted against I-1631 were points made in opposing advertising. It is possible that
advertising may have had a significant role in the defeat of I-1631. Early polls before the
election had I-1631 doing well, but as time went on and more opposition advertising was
released, polls indicated a slow but steady decline in the support for I-1631. It is possible
that the advertising campaign against I-1631 financed by over $30 million dollars from
out of state money may have been a significant factor in the initiative loosing.
Recommendations for Practice
Supporters of future carbon reduction initiatives may consider developing
arguments that support the initiative that are in line with values important to the
hierarchalist and individualist worldviews. In 2018 the advertising supporting I-1631
seemed to reflect the values of the communitarian and egalitarian worldviews. To gain
support from the other worldviews, supporters would do well to consider that there may
be arguments that would resonate with people who might otherwise be opposed to carbon
reduction based on worldview. By studying the underlying values of all worldviews,
arguments might be developed that would gain support from groups of voters considered
to be the opposition.
Recommendations for Future Research
While the stated research goal of this study was to determine whether worldview
was linked to how Washington State citizens voted on I-1631 in November, 2018, the
role of advertising in that election is worthy of note. More than $30 million dollars from
out of state sources was spent on opposing I-1631, and this may have played a role in the
defeat of I-1631. This study noted that those who opposed I-1631 provided reasons that
were consistent with arguments found in oppositional advertising. Future research might
64
focus on advertising that addresses values important to each of the four worldview and
how effective these differing arguments are on the voters.
Summary
A number of researchers have found worldview to be closely tied to how people
view risk issues. This study provided support for the contention that worldview is a
stronger predictor of climate-related attitudes and behaviors (in this case, voting behavior
on a carbon reduction initiative) than demographic variables, knowledge of climate
science, advertising, or political party affiliation. The strength of the connection between
voting and worldview may prove interesting and useful research possibilities for future
initiatives
65
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71
APPENDIX A
Survey Instrument
Questionnaire
This survey is part of a college study seeking to learn more about voter
reaction to I-1631. The title of the research project is Initiative 1631: Why
Voters Voted for or Against a Carbon Fee in Washington State Your assistance
is important in helping to complete this study. This survey is for
Washington State voters who were 18 or older in November 2018 and
who voted in the 2018 general election.
The subject of this survey is Washington Carbon Emissions Fee and
Revenue Allocation Initiative, also known as Initiative 1631 (I-1631). I1631 appeared before voters on the Washington State ballot in November
2018. It proposed to place a $15 per ton fee on the emission of greenhouse
gas.
You are being invited to participate in a research study titled Initiative
1631: Why Voters Voted for or Against a Carbon Fee in Washington State. This
study is being conducted by Philip Pearson, a student at The Evergreen
State College. The purpose of this research study is to understand voting
patterns in Washington State regarding the proposed carbon fee. If you
agree to take part in this study, you will be asked to complete an online
survey/questionnaire. This survey/questionnaire will ask a variety of
questions regarding your opinions about carbon fees and related issues. It
will take you approximately fifteen minutes to complete.
You will receive $2 through your Amazon Mechanical Turk account for
completing this survey. I expect that your participation in the study may
help researchers better understand voting patterns in Washington State
regarding carbon fee initiatives.
Risks to you are minimal and are likely to be no more than mild
discomfort with sharing your opinion. The survey will not collect
information that could be linked to you personally. Your answers in
this study will remain anonymous. By using the Amazon Mechanical
Turk online survey, your answers will be confidential. There is no
procedure for disclosing participant identity on this platform.
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Your participation in this study is completely voluntary and you can
withdraw at any time. You are free to skip any question that you
choose. If you have questions about this project or if you have a researchrelated problem, you may contact the researcher, Philip Pearson at
peaphi12@evergreen.edu. If you have any questions concerning your
rights as a research subject, or you experience problems as a result of
participating in this research project, you may contact John McLain,
Human Subjects Review Administrator at The Evergreen State College at
360.867.6045 or irb@evergreen.edu
By clicking “I agree” below you are indicating that you are at least 18
years old, have read and understood this consent form and agree to
participate in this research study. Please print a copy of this page for
your records if you wish.
□
□
I AGREE
I DISAGREE
1. Do you live in Washington State?
□
□
Yes
No (If no, the survey is finished)
2. Did you vote in Washington State in the 2018 general election?
□
□
73
Yes
No
(If no, the survey is finished)
3. In the 2018 general election, how did you vote on Initiative 1631 (I1631)?
□
□
□
□
For
Against
I did not vote on initiative 1631
(If so, the survey is finished)
I do not remember how I voted on Initiative 1631
(If so, the
survey is finished)
If you voted on I-1631 in the November 2018 Washington State election,
please continue:
4. If you voted for I-1631, please answer this question. What was the most
important reason that caused you to vote for I-1631?
□
□
It would have helped to reduce greenhouse gas emissions
It would have been a small step in the right direction to reduce
climate change
□
It would have helped many important programs in Washington
State
□
Washington State would have become the leader in reducing
greenhouse gas
emissions
□
□
Global warming is a serious threat
It would have hurt some of the biggest polluters
74
□
□
□
Advertising convinced me to vote for I-1631
People I know supported I-1631
Other
5. If you voted against I-1631, please answer this question. What was the
most important reason that caused you to vote against I-1631?
□
□
□
□
I oppose new taxes
It would have harmed poor people
It would have caused a loss of jobs
I support the concept but did not like that some large
greenhouse gas emitters were
exempt
□
□
□
□
I support the concept but felt that I-1631 was not well-written
Advertising convinced me to vote against I-1631
People I know opposed I-1631
Other
6. What is your age? (Select one)
□
□
□
□
75
18-29
30-39
40-49
50-59
□
□
60-69
70 and up
7. What is your political party affiliation? (Select one)
□
□
□
□
□
□
Republican
Democrat
Independent
Tea Party
No Affiliation
Other
8. How would you describe your political views?
□
□
□
□
□
Very Conservative
Moderately Conservative
Moderate
Moderately Liberal
Very Liberal
76
9. Gender:
□
□
□
Male
Female
Nonbinary
10. Where do you live? (Select only one)
□
□
□
□
□
Rural
Small Town (up to 10,000)
Large Town (10,001 to 50,000)
Small City
(50,001 to 100,000)
Large City
(100,001 to 100,000,000)
11. Highest education level (Select only one)
□
□
□
□
□
77
Less than high school diploma
High school diploma or GED
Some college
Bachelor’s degree
Graduate degree
12. Income level (Select only one)
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
$0-$25,000
$25,001-$50,000
$50,001-$75,000
$75,001-$100,000
$100,001-$125,000
$125,001-$150,000
Greater than $150,000
13. Did advertising influence how you voted on Initiative 1631?
□
□
□
□
Not at all
A little
Quite a bit
A great deal
14. I would rate my knowledge of science in general to be:
□
□
□
Very low
Low
Average
78
□
□
Above average
Very high
15. I would rate my knowledge of climate science to be:
□
□
□
□
□
Very low
Low
Average
Above average
Very high
16. Recently, you may have noticed that global warming has been getting
some attention in the news. Global warming refers to the idea that the
world’s average temperature has been increasing over the past 150 years,
may be increasing more in the future, and that the world’s climate may
change as a result. What do you think? Do you think that global warming
is happening?
□
□
□
79
Yes
No
Don’t know
17. Assuming global warming is occurring, do you think it is:
□
□
□
Caused mostly by human activity
Caused mostly by natural changes in the environment
Caused equally by human activities and natural changes in the
environment
□
None of the above because climate change is not happening
There are no wrong answers to the following questions. Please select the
answer that best reflects your beliefs.
18. We have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this country.
□
□
□
□
Strongly disagree
Mildly disagree
Mildly agree
Strongly agree
19. Society as a whole has become too soft and feminine
□
□
□
□
Strongly disagree
Mildly disagree
Mildly agree
Strongly agree
80
20. It seems like blacks, women, homosexuals, and other groups don’t
want equal rights, they want special rights just for them.
□
□
□
□
Strongly disagree
Mildly disagree
Mildly agree
Strongly agree
21. Discrimination against minorities is still a very serious problem in our
society.
□
□
□
□
81
Strongly disagree
Mildly disagree
Mildly agree
Strongly agree
22. We need to dramatically reduce inequalities between the rich and the
poor, whites and people of color, and men and women.
□
□
□
□
Strongly disagree
Mildly disagree
Mildly agree
Strongly agree
23. Our society would be better off if the distribution of wealth was more
equal.
□
□
□
□
Strongly disagree
Mildly disagree
Mildly agree
Strongly agree
24. The government interferes too much in our everyday lives.
□
□
□
□
Strongly disagree
Mildly disagree
Mildly agree
Strongly agree
82
25. The government should stop telling people how to live their lives.
□
□
□
□
Strongly disagree
Mildly disagree
Mildly agree
Strongly agree
26. It’s not the government’s business to try to protect people from
themselves.
□
□
□
□
Strongly disagree
Mildly disagree
Mildly agree
Strongly agree
27. Sometimes government needs to make laws that keep people from
hurting themselves.
□
□
□
□
83
Strongly disagree
Mildly disagree
Mildly agree
Strongly agree
28. Government should put limits on choices individuals can make so
they don’t get in the way of what’s good for society.
□
□
□
□
Strongly disagree
Mildly disagree
Mildly agree
Strongly agree
29. The government should do more to advance society’s goals, even if
that means limiting the freedom and choices of individuals.
□
□
□
□
Strongly disagree
Mildly disagree
Mildly agree
Strongly agree
_________________________________________________________________
Thank you for taking this survey
84
APPENDIX B
HSR Approval
85
Human Subjects Review
Applicant:
Project Title:
Protocol Number:
Date:
Philip L. Pearson
Initiative 1631, Why Voters Voted for or against a Carbon Fee in
Washington State
1819-049
June 21, 2019
Dear Philip L. Pearson,
The Institutional Review Board (IRB) Administrator has reviewed your human subjects
review application and has determined that the proposed project is exempt research and
does not require IRB approval and oversight. The exemption category for the research is
found in 45 CFR §46.104(d)(2)(i):
(2) Research that only includes interactions involving educational tests
(cognitive, diagnostic, aptitude, achievement), survey procedures,
interview procedures, or observation of public behavior (including visual
or auditory recording) if at least one of the following criteria is met:
(i) The information obtained is recorded by the investigator in such a
manner that the identity of the human subjects cannot readily be
ascertained, directly or through identifiers linked to the subjects…
In the unlikely event that any harm or risk of harm to human subjects surfaces in the
course of your research, we ask you to stop the research immediately and contact the
Institutional Review Board office within 1 (one) business day for further review and
consultation.
Please keep this letter for your record.
Best wishes on your project,
John McLain
Institutional Review Board Administrator
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HHuman Subjects Review | L3207 | (360) 867-6045 | irb@evergreen.edu The Evergreen State College | 2700 Evergreen
Parkway NW | Olympia, Washington 98505 | evergreen.edu
87
